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Application of a structural model to a wholesale 
electricity market:  
The Spanish market from January 1999 to June 2007 
Vítor Marques




The aim of this work is to analyse the agents’ behaviour in highly concentrated and strongly regulated electricity 
wholesale markets with rigid demand. In order to accomplish this aim, the analysis was based on the former 
Spanish electricity generation market, between January 1999 and June 2007, before the MIBEL (Iberian Electricity 
Market) has started. The analysis is carried out in the theoretical framework of the structural models. The result of 
the structural model
4 supports the apparently competitive nature of the market analysed for the period 1999 to 
2003, despite than fact that the Lerner index average was high during this period. It will therefore be important in 
future work to analyse whether the high average mark -up verified accords with the CTCs  (stranded costs 
compensation which have  the characteristics of  contracts for difference)  which frame the activities of the 
electricity producers.  
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1  FRAMEWORK 
The aim of this work is to analyse the behaviour of agents in the Spanish electricity generation market during the 
period January 1999 to June 2007, before the MIBEL (Iberian Electricity Market) began operating, on the basis of 
monthly data. 
The analysis has been undertaken within the theoretical framework of structural model s, which also corresponds 
to the theoretical framework of the “New Industrial Economics”. This framework is based on the existence of 
causal relationships between related variables, explained by economic theory. These relationships are, in general 
terms, expressed by the resolution of a system of equations, thus implying equilibrium. Therefore any analysis 
undertaken within this theoretical framework is based on a set of assumptions, with different perspectives, which 
incorporate both the assumed economic relationships and the functional forms of the equations representing the 
causal relationships in the model. These presuppositions influence the results obtained using this methodology.  
The application of this methodology to the Spanish wholesale electricity market, taking into account the obvious 
specific  features  relating  to  the  nature  of  the  product  and  its  strongly  institutionalised  context,  offers  an 
interesting scenario in which to test the applicability of this methodology by re-assessing some of its premises: 
functional forms of equations, estimation of endogenous variables and economic balance. To this end, the results 
were cross-referenced with results obtained outside the structural model using marginal cost estimates and the 
definition of price elasticity of demand for the different functional forms. The analysis focuses on an extended 
period, thus enabling the long- and medium-term strategies which prevail in a capital-intensive sector such as the 
electricity  sector  to  be  assessed.  This  focus  also  has  the  advantage  of  enabling  the  applicability  of  these 
methodologies to be tested, based on economic equilibrium, over extended periods of time 
1.1  BRIEF  BACKGROUND  TO  THE  ELECTRICITY  GENERATION  MARKET  DURING  THE  PERIOD 
UNDER ANALYSIS 
Between 1988 and 1997 the legal framework for the Spanish electricity sector was the Marco Legal Estable (MLE). 
The  MLE  aimed  to  remunerate  investments  “correctly”  and  create  incentives  for  efficient  management  in  a 
manner similar to yardstick competition. Through Royal Decrees 1538/1987 and 40/1994, all the costs of the 
Spanish electricity generating power stations were guaranteed by the electricity tariff, calculated for each station 
using standard costing methods. 
Spain transposed Directive 96/92/EC into Law 54/1997 of 27 November, which came into effect on 1 January 1998. 
As a result of this, all generators with an installed capacity of more than 50 MW who were not operating under the 3 
special regime
5, had to present their bids in a spot market auction of the uniform price market variety, in which 
the price defined at any given hour by  the marginal technology, that is, the price at which the purchase and sale 
offers cross, would be the price for all the electricity traded during that hour. 
Thus the Spanish  electricity generating power stations lost the MLE guarantee that their  investments would be 
remunerated. In order to resolve the situation, the new law established a transitional system known as Costes de 
Transicón a la Competencia (CTC  – “stranded  costs”).  This allowed  the companies  that  owned the electricity 
generating power stations, who on 31/12/97 were covered by the MLE, to receive partial compensation for loss of 
income for a maximum period of 10 years (up to 31/12/2007). This compensation was derived from the difference 
between the previously guaranteed electricity tariff and the expected prices in the liberalised market. The market 
price that served as a reference in calculating the CTC was 6 ESP/kWh (36 €/MWh). This sum represented the cost 
of new entry into the Spanish electricity market or, in other words, the long-term marginal cost. The market price 
for the electricity sold included a fixed portion of 1.3 ESP/kWh (approximately 7.8 €/MWh) that would compensate 
for the electricity generating power station supply guarantee.  
The period of time analysed in this work may be subdivided into two phases. In the first phase, which lasted until 
the start of 2004, the Spanish wholesale market was characterised by a certain level of stability, both regulatory 
and structural. Although the market was open to competition, in real terms a transitional regime was operating in 
which the revenue obtained by producers fell, to a greater or lesser extent, within the framework of the CTCs. This 
allowed  the  producers  a  guaranteed  income,  regardless  of  trends  in  market  price.  In  the  second  phase,  the 
structure of the market changed due to changes in electricity production and in the regulatory framework. With 
regard to the former, the business and production structure of the electricity sector in Spain altered following the 
entry of a group of new companies, the introduction of combined cycle natural gas plants and the increasing 
importance of plants based on renewable energy sources. As far as the changes in the legislative framework are 
concerned, these were essentially aimed at dynamising the wholesale market and making it more competitive. 
Within this context, the following legislative measures should be emphasised:  
  Royal Decree 436/2004, which enabled producers operating under the special regime to sell energy at a 
regulated tariff or to sell it on the spot markets, the futures markets or even through bilateral contracts, in 
the latter case receiving a subsidy in addition to the revenue from this method of selling electricity. 
  Royal Decree-Law 5 /2005, which established the end of the obligation to trade electricity on the daily and 
intra-daily markets.  
  Royal Decree-Law 3/2006 which provisionally defined that the energy traded on the spot market between 
companies belonging to the same group would be treated as energy traded through bilateral contracts, 
with prices limited to 42.35 €/MWh. This measure remained in force until January 2007, when legislation 
                                                                 
5 Small producers whose energy is produced from renewable energy sources or from cogeneration. 4 
was  published  to  provide  a  framework  for  the  negotiation  of  bilateral  contracts  involving  physical 
deliveries. 
  Royal Decree-Law 7/2006, which ended the CTCs. 
1.2  MAIN METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
Taking  econometric  models  as  its  basis,  the  structural  analyses  enable  the  causal  relationships  between  the 
structure of the market and the behaviour of companies to be defined, supported by economic theory. The origins 
of this type of approach can be found in the work of the Cowles Commission on econometrics which, between 
1939 and 1955, sought to develop econometric models that would enable economic theory to be related to 
mathematics and statistics. On this basis, a wide range of work on econometrics in general and in relation to the 
theory of equilibrium in particular was developed. Structural models emerged from this framework, associated 
with  econometric  models composed of multiple  equations, capable of  describing different  kinds of  economic 
behaviour (Reiss and Wolak, 2005). 
Within  the context of  industrial economics this new  conceptual  framework is  called  New Empirical Industrial 
Organization  (NEIO).  It  emerged  at  the  end  of  the  1970s  in  clear  opposition  to  the  traditional  paradigm  for 
industrial economics which correlated structure, behaviour and profit.  
The main criticism levelled against the traditional model by the authors of the NEIO was concerned with the fact 
that this model only explains the correlations existing between dependent and independent variables and does 
not resolve the problems of endogeneity (Kadiyali, et al., 2001). In fact, the traditional model does not allow the 
causal  relationships  existing  between  the  variables  that  comprise  the  models  to  be  shown,  unlike  the  new 
paradigm (Reiss and Wolak, 2005).  
However, as we shall see, the main criticisms that can be directed towards the NEIO lie in the obligation to 
internalise the deduction of certain variables belonging to the right-hand side of the equations in the structural 
models. Therefore, in the new conceptual framework mark-up cannot be observed and costs must be estimated or 
deduced using, for example, productive factor prices.  
In  this  way  the  conclusions  resulting  from  the  application  of  structural  models  depend  to  a  great  extent  on 
assumptions relating to the functional forms of the equations that comprise each model or the instrumental 
variables chosen. In the case of the definition of the behavioural parameter in the models used to analyse market 
power, the instrumental variables chosen may distort the estimates (Corts, 1999, cited in Perloff, et al., 2007, p. 
47).  5 
Independently  of  these  kinds  of  constraints,  as  we  shall  see  later,  there  are  also  problems  concerning  the 
identification of  the  model,  which  may,  however,  be  solved  using  the  methodology  developed  by  Bresnahan 
(1982) and Lau (1982). 
In the case of the electricity sector, the application of the structural model resulting from equilibrium and the 
consequent resolution of a system of equations was undertaken relatively late. For example, in the case of the 
English  market,  one  of  the  most  widely-studied  electricity  markets,  as  far  as  we  are  able  to  determine  this 
methodology was applied for the first time using the Bresnhan-Lau model by Wolfram (1999) to supplement the 
direct determination of market power. In the case of the Nordic electricity market, Nordpool, this approach was 
applied for the first time in 2000 by Hjalmarsson, based on a dynamic version of the Bresnahan-Lau model in order 
to analyse market power. The late application of this type of model to electricity sectors is, in part, the result of the 
fact that liberalisation only began in the electricity sectors at the end of the 1980s. Another, possibly fundamental 
reason for its late application arose out of the difficulty of inferring two of the main variables which define market 
power; price elasticity of demand and marginal costs. The econometric models applied to the electricity sector are 
therefore usually models containing only one equation (as affirmed by Fezzi and Bunn, 2006) located outside a 
purely structural framework in which quantity is considered an external variable. Price elasticity of demand is 
considered perfectly inelastic (for example, in Borenstein, et al., 2002; Goto and Karoly, 2004; Joskow and Kahn, 
2002; Mansur, 2003; Wolak, 2002) or predetermined (for example in Borenstein, et al., 1999; Borenstein and 
Bushnell,  1999;  Green  and  Newbery,  1992;  Wolfram,  1999).  With  regard  to  marginal  cost,  this  is  generally 
determined outside the model (for example, in Borenstein, et al., 2002; Fabra and Toro, 2005; Joskow and Kahn, 
2002; Puller; 2007; Wolfram, 1999). In the specific case of the Spanish electricity market, the work developed by 
Pérez-Arriaga in his book Libro Blanco (2005), which underscored some of the reforms taking place in the sector 
from this date onwards, is a clear example of the definition of estimated market power achieved by considering 
price elasticity of demand to be inelastic, and marginals defined outside the model. 
The next section presents the theoretical framework which supports the work developed and is concerned with 
the analysis of the behaviour of agents. The issues that most directly related to the structural analysis are also 
presented. 
1.2.1  DEFINITION OF AGENT BEHAVIOUR 
The electricity production market is very similar to a market that adopts Cournot strategies, with restrictions of 
capacity (Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983). Within this framework, the quantities correspond to the decision variable.  6 
Starting with the Nash-Cournot solution for the Spanish oligopolistic market and reprising the Cowling-Waterson 
formula (1976), the Lerner index and type of strategies developed by companies can be correlated using the θ
6 
index. 
On the basis of this deduction, equilibrium exists in which the economic agents maximise their economic profits 
taking the demand and cost function into account: 
 
          
           
                                                                                                                                                                                (1) 
In which P is the inverse of the demand function, which depends on the quantities Q and a set of variables D, and C 
is the cost function, which also depends on quantities and a set of exogenous variables W which do not influence 
the price function. 
The profit π of a company i is therefore provided by the following: 
                                                                                                                                                                               (2) 
A first order condition for company profit maximisation is obtained by the order derivation of qi in equation (2): 
   
   
                                                                                                                                                                                               (3) 
This derivation establishes the equality of marginal revenue and marginal cost: 
      
  
       
         
   
                                                                                                                                                               (4) 
The expression of the left-hand side of equation (4) corresponds to the marginal revenue of the company i and the 
expression on the right-hand side to its marginal cost.  
With regard to marginal revenue, 
  
   is the slope of the demand curve and θi is the agent behaviour parameter i. 
Moreover: 
    
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             (5) 
By reorganising equation (4) and dividing it by PQ the following relationship is obtained: 
        
   
    
                                                                                                                                                                                  (6) 
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siθi is found in the interval      . If siθi is equal to 0, the company strategy i falls within perfect competition. If 
this variable is equal to 1, the company strategy corresponds to one of collusion.  
θi  may,  in  turn,  be  reinterpreted  within  the  framework  of  the  theory  of  conjectural  variations.  Within  this 
conceptual context, companies define their strategies by taking into account the “conjectures” they make with 
regard to the behaviour of their rivals in the light of any changes to their offers.   
In this context, the variable vi for the company i corresponds to the conjecture made by the company concerning 
the response in terms of production of its n-1 competitors when the company alters its production: 
    
    
   
                                                                                                                                                                                         (7) 
in which Q-i is the combined production of all the producers with the exception of producer i.  
Thus, for the company i, the relationship between θi and vi is given by: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                (8) 
vi belongs to the interval      
      
  
 . At the lower limit of the interval, a situation of perfect competition can be 
found, and at the upper limit a situation of collusion. 
The main disadvantage of the theory of conjectural variations is that it is difficult to interpret, particularly when 
the results obtained for the ratio θi  are not close to the results associated with well-defined strategic models (0, 
when the market is competitive; 1/si, when perfect collusion is verified; 1, in the case of the Cournot strategy). The 
continuity of the variable θi, understood in the interval [0;
 
  
], has no supporting theoretical model
7, meaning that 
the  results  must  be  interpreted  cautiously
8.  Another  criticism  concerns  its  theoretical  bases,  namely  the 
inconsistency of it being a static  model in which agents act  according to expectations  regarding the dynamic 
responses of competitors or even taking as its basis the debateable assumption that a company’s rivals react to a 
change in its behaviour. However, weak assumptions are common to a great many more complex approaches 
which form part of game theory, specifically with regard to the rationality of the agents and their access to 
                                                                 
7 See for example Perloff, et al. (2007) or Kadiyali, et al., (2001). 
8 See for example Muller and Normann (2003) which highlights the difficulty in ensuring consistency of the conjectural variation 
models. 8 
information. In addition, this approach is easy to apply and very useful in studies of market power (Church and 
Ware (2000)) although due caution should be exercised in interpreting the results.    
Assuming, on the one hand, that the companies share the same production function C(q,W) and, consequently, 
that they will all produce the same quantity q=qi  and, on the other hand, that the companies also share the same 
conjectures with regard to the strategies of their rivals, equation (6) may be extended to the entire industry
9. In 
these circumstances, si corresponds to 1/n, and equation (6) will correspond to: 
       
   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    (9) 
In  which  Cmg  is  marginal  cost  and  θ  the  industry  behavioural  variable.  In  this  case,  the  variable  θ  will  be 
understood in the interval [0;1].  
If the cost functions and conjectural variations are not considered to be shared by the agents in the market, both 
sides of equation (6) are multiplied by si for each company and each equation is calculated to correspond to each 
company in the industry, obtaining the following relationship for the industry as a whole: 
               
   
    
   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             (10) 
If it assumed that the company variables are similar,    which is equal to         will be obtained: 
               
   
    
   
 
 
     
        
   
 
     
      
                                                                                                                                          (11) 
in which            is the weighted marginal cost for the industry, HHI the Herfindahl-Hirschman index and    the factor 
measuring the level of market power, i.e. which corresponds to the Lerner index. In this case, the Lerner index is 
directly  related  to  the  level  of  concentration  and  is  also  related  to  the  conjectural  variations.  This  equation 
corresponds to the model described by Cabral (2000) which originated from the work of Cowling and Waterson 
(1976). In this context, if        
 
   , perfect collusion is verified; when           , Cournot behaviour is verified and, 
finally, when          , a perfectly competitive market prevails. 
The models developed are based on equation (11) and aim to deduce the numerator of the equation from its left-
hand side. Questions relating to the interpretation of the value obtained merit special attention. The results are 
interpreted as a parallel to the expected results produced by a recognised theoretical framework, namely the 
Cournot-Nash, collusion or competition framework. 
                                                                 
9 The high degree of concentration of the Spanish market, mainly in the early years, allows to suggest that this assumption does 
not skew the results. 9 
1.2.2  THE STRUCTURAL MODEL 
Thus, returning to system equations (1) and displaying the behavioural variable θ, the following structural model is 
obtained:  
   
          
             
                                                                                                                                                                       (12) 
In defining a structural model, two inter-related questions have to be solved: identification, i.e. estimation of the 
structural parameters, and the endogeneity of the variables. 
The question of identification occurs naturally in system equations, given that there are variables which appear on 
both their left and right sides. Thus, in a system equation at least one endogenous variable exists. 
The necessary condition required to identify an equation is the order condition. This establishes that at least as 
many exogenous variables excluded from each equation must exist as the number of endogenous variables that 
form part of the solution to the problem. The rank condition establishes that the exogenous variable excluded 
from the first equation must have a population different to zero in the second equation. Thus, for example, in a 
system of two equations in which only one endogenous variable exists in the first equation, there will have to be 
an exogenous variable in the second equation that is the instrumental variable of the endogenous variable from 
the first equation. 
In this work, the resolution of the problem of identification enables the demand function to be solved (in the first 
equation), i.e. the definition of price elasticity of demand, and the offer function (in the second equation). To this 
end,  it  is  necessary  to  distinguish  the  different  types  of  company  behaviour  in  competitive  situations  or  in 
situations in which market power is exercised after the occurrence of an external shock. Therefore, the demand 
function
10 should rotate in the face of an external shock rather than move in parallel. The inverse of the demand 
function is presented as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                                         (13) 
In equation (13) the variables D are exogenous variables. Variable D1 may be the price of a substitute product or, 
in the case of the electricity market, changes in meteorological conditions, and D2 is the disposable income. The 
term       is what enables the equation to rotate. 
The derivative of this equation, which corresponds to the function slope, yields the following expression: 
                                                                 
10 Several industrial economics textbooks cover the topic. In this case it follows the deduction of Church and Ware (2000)... 
(2000). 10 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                         (14) 
By introducing equation (14) into equation (4), extended to the entire industry, the following is obtained: 
                    
       
                                                                                                                                                   (15) 
Supposing: 
       
                                                                                                                                                                           (16) 
Then: 
                                                                                                                             (17) 
The system will have to be estimated  using equations (13)  and (17), which may  be  solved by excluding  two 
exogenous  variables  W  and  D2,  the  demand  and  supply  functions  respectively.  To  estimate  the  behavioural 
variable  , supposing that the marginal cost is constant
11, it is sufficient to divide       in equation (17) by     , 
estimated with the resolution of equation (13).  
                                                                 
11 Church and Ware (2000). 11 
2  APPLICATION OF THE MODEL 
2.1  APPROACHES 
As previously mentioned, the application of the structural model is not exempt from uncertainties, which are very 
much concerned with the presuppositions allowed for the functional forms, explicative variables and instrumental 
variables chosen and, in general terms, the methodology itself. 
This work makes use of data which make it possible to estimate with some accuracy the marginal cost incurred. 
This allows the application of the structural model used to define market power and the behavioural variable to be 
tested, comparing the results with an almost direct estimate of these variables. Parallel to this, following the work 
of Genesove and Mullin (1998), the consequences of estimating the price elasticity of demand for the functional 
forms assumed for the demand function is tested. 
In  general,  the  application  of  the  structural  model  materialises  in  this  present  case  in  the  resolution  of  the 
following system emerging from the inverse of equation (13) and equation (17): 
 
                                     
 
         
                 
 
                        
                                                                                                            (18) 
in which: 
  Zt, is the exogenous variable which allows the demand function to change its slope. 
  Dti, are explicative variables of the demand function. 
  Wtj are exogenous explicative marginal cost variables. 
At this point it is important to note that the uncertainties regarding the functional models of the supply function 
have major implications for the results obtained. Moreover, this is the main criticism levelled at structural models 
(see, for example, Perloff, (2007)). This work seeks to overcome this weakness identified in structural models by 
not resolving the equations in the model simultaneously, applying limited information methods. This approach, 
although implying a certain loss of precision in comparison with the simultaneous resolution of equations (full 
information methods), has two advantages according to Green (2003). Firstly, it does not spread errors specific to 
one equation to another. Secondly, the associated methodologies, namely that of the 2 Stage Least Square will 
vary less than those which are related to full information methods, such as the 3 Stage Least Square. In this case, 
the limited information method makes it possible to resolve with greater certainty a model in which the functional 
forms of the equations of which it is composed are not certain. 12 
Solving each equation separately does not prevent both from being inter-related, since the exogenous variables in 
one system equation in include the set of instrumental variables from the other equation. 
The application of the structural model is based on the assumption that the demand equation is a linear function. 
However, in the case of supply, in addition to a linear functional form, a logarithmic functional form is also tested 
in which marginal cost is estimated on the basis of a function inspired by the Translog function.  
The results were compared with the results obtained when the analysis is performed outside the framework of the 
structural  model  strictu-senso.  In  this  case,  equation  (11)  is  solved  by  assuming  that  all  the  variables  are 
exogenous, with the exception of the behavioural variable θ
12 and on the basis of estimates of market marginal 
costs. 
The comparison of these results with the results previously obtained enables us to understand the implications of 
the endogenisation of the marginal cost parameter and, in a broader sense, the consequences and limitations of 
applying a pure structural model. The equation which represents demand is solved using a regression of this type:  
                       
 
                                                                                                                                                  (19) 
This  regression  is  not  merely  solved  by  one  functional  form
13.  Four  functional  forms  (linear,  logarithmic, 
exponential and quadratic) are presented. This approach enables the consequences of using different functional 
forms in estimating demand price elasticity forms to be tested. 
Subsequently, the following regression is solved, based on the Lerner index, in order to estimate the behaviour 
factor  : 
    
    
                                                                                                                                                                                    (20) 
in which cmgt represents the marginal cost for month t. Finally, in both cases equation (11) is applied in order to 
interpret λ: 
      
                                                                                                                                                                                              (21) 
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  need  to  estimate  exogenous  explicative  variables,  in  the  majority  of  cases 
underlying economic relations, meant that monthly data had to be used, naturally focussing the work on the 
analysis of medium- and long-term equilibriums and strategies. 
                                                                 
12 It could be considered unreasonable that the degree of market concentration is an exogenous variable. However, as will be 
seen the special case of the market and the analysis period this assumption may well be accepted. 
13 Following the methodology of  Genesove andMullin (1998). 13 
2.2  THE DEMAND FUNCTION EQUATION FOR ELECTRICITY 
2.2.1  DESCRIPTION OF MARKET 
The model chosen corresponds to the monthly demand-supply equation for the (daily and intra-daily) Spanish 
wholesale electricity spot market for the stated period. 
OMEL is the wholesale market operator. The market is divided into the daily and the intraday markets. In the daily 
market, the electricity producers submit bids for the sale amounts of electricity on an hourly basis for the following 
day at a minimum price and the buyers (distributors, suppliers and eligible consumers) submit hourly bids to buy 
electricity at a maximum price. On the basis of these offers, OMEL constructs the hourly curves for the purchase 
and sale of electricity, in which the price at any given hour at which transactions are effected (called the system 
marginal price) results from the crossing of these curves. 
Energy  with  physical  delivery  was  also  transacted  through  bilateral  contracts  with  international  entities.  The 
publication of Royal Decree  5/2005 ended the obligation to transact all energy in the market regime on the 
wholesale market, thus enabling bilateral contracts to exist with national entities on the margins of this market. 
During the period under analysis, over 90% of electricity was traded on the daily market. 
On the intraday market the final calculations are made on the actual day in order to adjust supply and demand. 
The intra-daily market consists of 6 blocks of offers. 
The system operator, Red Electrica de España, is responsible for resolving any technical constraints, as well as 
physical adjustments between production and consumption.  
Another source of revenue for producers comes from remuneration for the availability of declared production 
(“power guarantee”).  
The final price of the electricity traded on the wholesale market, before distribution, comes in the main from the 
daily and intraday markets which generally represent 70% to 80% of this price, with the remainder coming from 
the guarantee of capacity and from the system operation. 
2.2.2  DEFINITION OF THE DEMAND FUNCTION 
In general, given the linear functional form, the demand function is presented as follows: 
                     
 
                                                                                                                                                          (22) 
in which Pt, is the price of electricity and Wkt another factor k explaining the price trend.  14 
2.2.2.1  DEMAND FUNCTION VARIABLES  
Two distinct phases may be observed in the demand for electricity in the daily and intraday markets during the 
period under analysis: 
  Up  to  February  2006,  these  markets  represented  over  95%  of  electricity  consumption  in  Spain.  This 
preceded the implementation of Royal Decree-Law 3/2006 which, during 2006, imposed a limit on the 
trading price for companies within the same group and a complete end to the obligation to purchase on 
the spot market (Royal Decree 5/2005). 
  From March 2006 onwards, when these markets with their highs and lows, saw their importance in terms 
of total consumption substantially lowered, specifically with the withdrawal of most of Iberdrola’s bids on 
the daily and intra-daily markets in response to Royal Decree-Law 3/2006. 
Bearing  in  mind  that  electricity  consumption  reflects  economic  activity,  any  variables  which  reflect  overall 
economic activity in Spain would appear to be the best option for explaining the long-term trends in the demand 
for electricity and therefore the Spanish GDP was the obvious choice of variable.  
However, the GDP is a variable for which data is provided quarterly. We sought to overcome this problem by 
estimating the monthly development of the GDP, specifically on the basis of other indicators such as industrial 
production. However, the estimation of the GDP on a monthly basis is not a significant variable.  
It is known that in Spain the speed of electricity consumption grew at a pace faster than that of the GDP. The 
intensive increase in energy on this country operates in counter-cycle to the main western economies. Parallel to 
this, the consumption of automotive gas oil has also increased by more than the GDP in recent years. These facts 
result from the increased purchasing power in Spain is not reflected in any change in the productive structure of 
the country, mirrored by an increase in the energy intensity of the GDP when calculated on the basis of electricity 
or gas oil (Mendiluce, et al., 2009). On the contrary, the increase in purchasing power in Spain has been based on 
activities with low added value, such as civil construction. 
In addition, some studies have shown that in the previous decade the consumption of automotive gas oil in Spain 
evolved differently from that of other fuels, with a much lower price elasticity of demand, a characteristic which it 
shares with electricity consumption. This is due to the indirect support of the Spanish government in providing a 
fiscal subsidy for gas oil in comparison with other fuels as a means of supporting investments in the construction 
sector, namely highways (González-Marrero, et al., 2008).  
Therefore for the period under analysis, automotive gas oil was chosen as the independent variable for the price of 
electricity, as it provides a better reflection of the evolution in economic activity in Spain in recent years. In 
addition, the seasonal nature of this variable is very similar to that of electricity consumption, as will be seen later. 15 
The following graph shows that the trend for the consumption of gas oil and electricity developed in a relatively 
parallel manner up to February 2006, although gas oil consumption appears more volatile than electricity up to 
this date.  
Figure 2-1 – Volumes of diesel fuel consumed and electricity traded  
Base 100 in January 1999 
 
 
Source: OMEL, Ministry for Industry, Tourism and Trade  
However, this variable is not an exogenous variable of electricity consumption. The consumption of electricity and 
automotive gas oil share some factors that explain their variations, which are very much related to cycles of 
economic  activity  and for which a set of  instrumental variables must be taken  into  consideration,  as will be 
demonstrated later. 
It must be remembered that the identification of the model requires a number of exogenous variables for the 
consumption of electricity to be defined that are at least equal to the number of exogenous variables for the 
supply function of electricity. The variables chosen are those which explain in part the typical seasonal behaviour 
of demand.  
It is known that the seasonal nature of the demand for electricity is due as much to the seasonality of economic 
activity as is to changes in temperature. 
Therefore the feasibility of some variables representative of economic seasonality (“stays in hotels”, “industrial 










































































































































































14) was tested. However, some of these variables were abandoned as they were not 
statistically significant (working days per month, average monthly temperature, private consumption and industrial 
production). From the aforementioned set of variables, two were chosen which reflect the annual seasonal nature 
of the demand for electricity: the number of stays in hotels each month, whose seasonality develops in inverse 
proportion to the demand for electricity and actual economic activity, and the monthly temperature difference in 
comparison with the average monthly figures. In the structural model, the latter variable was also considered the 
variable that enabled the demand function to “rotate” so that the cost component could be identified separately 
from the strategic component. 
Figure 2-2 – Evolution of amounts of electricity traded and variables which define seasonality 
Base 100 January 1999 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas, Ministerio de Industria, Turismo Y Comercio 
The incorporation of the variable “overnight stays” (number of overnight stays per month in the hotel industry) in 
the regression is due to the fact that consumption of electricity is greater in winter than in summer. As the number 
of overnight stays is far greater in summer than in winter, this variable has an inverse relationship to the amounts 
of electricity consumed, lessening the impact in summer of the variable “Temperature Difference” (Difference in 
                                                                 






































































































































































Overnight stays Difference of temperature Amount of electricity17 
temperature each month in comparison with the average annual amount). The doubts raised by the introduction 
of this variable into the model led to Wald tests being performed for the rejection of the explicative variables in 
the model. The results are presented in the tables which follow for 79 (up to February 2006) and 95 observations 
(the complete series).  
It can be observed that for 86 observations the H0 hypotheses for the elimination of the variables were rejected, 
with the exception of the “Temperature Differences” variable However, when the test was carried out for the 
“Overnight  Stays”  (number  of  overnight  stays  in  hotels  per  month)  and  “Temperature  Differences”  variables 
together, the test rejected the H0 hypothesis for the elimination of variables for a lower level of significance than 
when it is performed on each of these variables separately. This result proves the relationship existing between 
the “Overnight Stays” and “temperature differences” variables. 
In 95 observations, the H0 hypothesis is rejected in all cases, but only for a level of significance higher than 10%. 
This fact is explained by taking into account the fact that from February 2006, as we have seen, the regulatory 
changes imposed on the market altered the behaviour of the demand curve in the electricity wholesale markets in 
Spain.  
Table 1 –Wald Test to eliminate variables 
 
Table 2 presents the statistics that describe the variables chosen for the electricity demand function for the daily 
and intraday markets:  
  Number of overnight stays in hotels each month, “Overnight Stays”. 
  Temperature  difference  for  each  month  compared  to  the  average  annual  figure,  “Temperature 
Difference”. 
  Automotive gas oil consumed each month, “Diesel oil”. 
  Amount of electricity traded on the daily and intra-daily markets each month, “Amount of Electricity”. 
95 Observations 79 Observations
Overnight stays 3.216 [0.073] 6.924 [0.009] 
Temperature 
difference
3.830 [0.050] 0.9632 [0.326]
Diesel oil 2.938 [0.087] 65.198 [0.000] 
Overnight stays and 
temperature 
difference
5.175 [0.075] 12.577 [0.002]
Statistic χ2  *Prob.+18 
  Average price of electricity traded on the daily and intra-daily markets each month, “Electricity Price”. 
In addition to these variables, a dummy variable must also be considered, which represents the change in the 
regulatory  framework  for  these  markets  with  the  entry  into  force  of  Royal  Decree-Law  3/2006  and  its 
implementation during 2006. 19 
Table 2 – Correlation coefficient for variables 
 
Table 3 – Descriptive statistics for variables  
 
2.2.2.2  STATIONARITY OF DEMAND FUNCTION 
In time series, problems arising out of the spurious relationships are common, taking the form of variables with 
very high correlations that lack any causal relationship between them. The existence of spurious relationships 
between variables is associated with the fact that they are not stationary, corresponding in general to the fact that 
the variance and average are not constant over time. 
The stationarity of each variable can be tested using the ADF (Augmented Dick Fuller) unit root test, with the order 
of the test chosen by taking into account the combined analysis of Akaike and Schwartz information criteria. 
Diesel Overnight stays      Difference of 
temperature      
Amount of 
electricity     
Electricity price        
Diesel 1 -0.30778 0.18648 0.88107 0.44659
Overnight stays      -0.30778 1 0.15409 -0.024948 0.079977
Difference of temperature       0.18648 0.15409 1 0.43088 0.24784
Amount of electricity      0.88107 -0.024948 0.43088 1 0.51977
Electricity price         0.44659 0.079977 0.24784 0.51977 1
Difference of 
temperature
Overnight stays Electricity 
price
Diesel Amount of 
electricity
Observations 102 102 102 102 102
Unit: Celcius Número €/MWh t GWh
Minimum 0.03 9 797 643 18.25 1 795 801 13 322
Maximum 11.88 37 636 212 73.33 3 348 391 25 387
Average 5.72 19 621 752 36.83 2 542 182 18 546
Median 6.00 19 515 610 35.28 2 536 045 18 181
Standard deviation 3.03 7 543 818 12.59 360 072 2 443
Variance 9.19 5.69E+13 158.50 1.30E+11 5 969 390
Kurtosis  -0.96 -0.93 0.55 -0.81 -0.22
Skewness -0.07 0.42 1.00 -0.06 0.3820 
Stationary tests were performed for the series up to February 2006 and for the series up to June 2007, in order to 
take into account the legislative changes which took place in February 2006.  
Seasonal variations are analysed without trend, whilst the remainder are analysed with trend. Given its specific 
nature, the price variable is analysed with and without trend. 
The following table shows that in the 95 observations
15 two variables exist, for which the null hypothesis of a unit 
root cannot be rejected: the “amount of electricity” and “electricity price” (with trend) variables. 
Table 4 –ADF tests on demand function variables - 95 observations 
 
In 79 observations
16, in addition to the variables previously cited, the “electricity price” variable (without trend) is 
another variable for which the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected. 
Table 5 –ADF tests on demand function variables - 79 observations 
 
It is important to note that in comparison with the amount of electricity traded, electricity price is an extremely 
volatile variable. 
                                                                 
15 Order 6 ADF test. 








Diesel oil Overnight stays Temperature 
difference
Choosen order 6 0 0 6 6 4
Trend Yes No Yes Yes No No
Statistic test -3.4089 -1.6893 -2.4479 -7.2726 -7.9847 -4.1163









Diesel oil Overnight stays Temperature 
difference
Choosen order 0 0 0 2 5 4
Trend Yes No Yes Yes No No
Statistic test -2,7843 -2,9323 -3,2605 -7,4411 -9,4873 -4,4325
Critical value for the ADF 
statitistic -3,4571 -2,8918 -3,4571 -3,4571 -2,8918 -2,891821 
Figure 2-3 – Comparative trends for amounts and price in the daily and intra-daily markets 
 
All the variables in first difference are stationary, both for the series with 79 and the series with 95 observations. 
Table 6 –ADF tests series 1-95  
 
Table 7 – ADF tests series 1-79  
   
Thus the variables are characterised in terms of integration in the following way: 









Amount of electricity Price of electricity
Amount of 
electricity
Price of electricity Diesel oil Overnight stays Temperature 
difference
Choosen order 0 1 6 6 6
Statitistic test -10.4 -9.0906 -7.2401 -8.5362 -4.9508
Critical value for the ADF statistic -2.8922 -2.8922 -2.8922 -2.8922 -2.8922
Amount of 
electricity
Price of electricity Diesel oil Overnight stays Temperature 
difference
Choosen order 5 4 6 3 6
Statitistic test -5,2783 -5.3921 -6.7172 -6.1681 -4.5459
Critical value for the ADF statistic -2.8986 -2.8986 -2.8986 -2.8986 -2.898622 
  “Electricity price”, I(1), for 79 and 95 observations
17. 
  “Diesel oil”, “Overnight stays” and “Temperature differences” are I(0), for 79 and 95 observations. 
In a model composed of two or more non-stationary variables, the differentiation of the variables it contains does 
not provide adequate information in terms of levels unless the variables are co-integrated (Wooldbridge, 2006). 
Two I(1) variables will be co-integrated if a long-term balance exists between them. In this case, the relationship 
between the two variables is stationary.  
As they are co-integrated, the variables cannot diverge for an indefinite period of time from the balance which 
characterises  them  (Banerjee,  et  al.,  1993).  The  linear  combination  between  two  co-integrated  variables,  for 
example Xt and Yt, is stationary as long as the error term,   , which represents the imbalance between the two 
variables is stationary:  
                                                                                                                                                                                             (23) 
Thus, given the existence of two variables I(1) in the model, the analysis of their stationarity involves testing for 
the existence of a co-integration relationship.  
In economic terms, it can easily be understood that in the short and medium tern the demand for electricity and 
its price varies in inverse proportion in the short and medium term and this relationship is measured by the 
elasticity of the demand price. However, in the long-term, this inverse relationship can no longer be verified. Thus, 
if an inverse relationship between the long-term price and demand for electricity is considered, and a continuous 
growth in demand is maintained, this will be reflected in a lowering of the price of electricity, until it tends to 
become null. However, this trend is not verified; on the contrary, the increase in demand has been accompanied 
by an increase in the price of electricity, although not always at the same pace. This trend is understandable. The 
increase in the demand for electricity has been satisfied by recourse to more expensive production technologies 
(such as renewable energies) or by conventional fossil fuel technologies (natural gas, coal, fuel oil) which, in turn, 
are limited and have tended to become more expensive due to the limited reserves.  
The test for the existence of a co-integration relationship between variables followed Johansen’s methodology 
(Johansen, 1988), based on a VAR model (Vector Autoregression Model) transformed into an Error Correction 
Model (ECM). This approach has the advantage of presenting more efficient results for testing co-integration than 
the traditional ADF unit root test on remainders when more than one variable I(1)  exists in the model (Pesaran, 
and Pesaran, 1997). 
                                                                 
17If we consider there is a trend, otherwise, for 95 observations it is I(0) 23 
In Error Correction Models, the short-term dynamics (changes) and those of the long term (levels) are modelled 
simultaneously. Let us take the example given by Green (Green, 2000) and assume two co-integrated variables Yt 
and Zt I(1), with the co-integration vector given by [1;-θ]. Thus, ΔYt, ΔZt and (Yt,- θZt) are I(0). The error correction 
model will be: 
                                                                                                                                         (24) 
As  Xt is  the set of  variables that  are exogenous to the model, if the  Xt variables are  I(0),  the model will be 
stationary.   , the factor in the error correction term, corresponds to the speed with which the variable Yt is 
adjusted towards its long-term balance. 
The ECM theoretical framework enables Johansen’s methodology (Joahnsen, 1988) to be applied in order to test 
the co-integration of variables.  
In this case, the VAR representation of the ECM model will be: 
                          
   
                                                                                                         (25) 
in which: 
          
    
  , Tt is a vector of the endogenous price and quantity I(1) variables . 
  St is a vector of the exogenous variables(1): 
                   
   
                                                                                                                                   (26) 
  Wt is a vector of the exogenous variables I(0) (“overnight stays”, “temperature difference” and “Diesel 
oil”), which does not include terms for trends and interceptions. 
This  model  corresponds  to  a  VECM  (Vector  ECM)  in  which      is  the  matrix  which  contains  the  long-term 
multipliers and in which the matrices                    capture the dynamics of the short-term. The O model 
does not consider the trend term, bearing in mind that the interpretation in the strict sense of a co-integration 
relationship  implies  that  the  regression  of  the  two  co-integrated  variables  is  stationary  and  without  trend 
(Wooldbridge, 2006). 
The characteristic of the matrix   , r, corresponds to the number of co-integration vectors (relationships), with h 
being the number of endogenous variables (in this case, 2) if: 
  r = h, all variables are stationary, meaning any linear combination of variables is also stationary. 
  r = 0, individually the variables are I(1) and are not therefore co-integrated. 
  0 < r < h-1, individually the variables are I(1), with r co-integration vectors. In this case there is 1 vector. 24 
First the order of the VAR model must be defined. Subsequently, the number of co-integration vectors must be 
defined. 
Information criteria (Akaike, Schwarz) suggest that the VAR model for the equation (25) has only one order. 
The statistics
18 presented in the following tables clearly enable the  H0 hypothesis of the non-existence of a co-
integration relationship to be rejected, meaning that the H0 hypothesis for the existence of more than one  co-
integration relationship also cannot be accepted.  
Table 8 – Statistics for the Maximal Eigenvalue (86 observations) for a VAR model of order 1 
 
Table 9 – Trace statistics (86 observations) for a VAR model of order 1 
 
The results for 102 observations, although similar to the results presented, do not express the existence of an 
order relationship very clearly which, for reasons already explained, is to be expected. 
In  this  way,  it  may  be  considered  that  the  variables  “Electricity  price”  and  “Amount  of  electricity”  are  co-
integrated, i.e.                 
It may be recalled that one of the main objectives of this work is to test the consequences of considering the 
different functional forms involved in the application of the structural model, without focussing on the processes 
of short term imbalances. Error Correction Models will therefore not be used in this work to estimate parameters. 
Thus the “simple” linear demand form (not taking into account “Temperature differences” as a variable which 
“rotates” the demand function) developed through the OLS will be: 
                                                                                                                                  (27) 
                                                                 
18 Based on Liflihood Ratios tests. 




r = 0 r=1 93.33 25.77 23.08
r <= 1 r=2 4.71 12.39 10.55




r = 0 r=1 98.04 19.22 17.18
r <= 1 r=2 4.71 12.39 10.5525 
The ADF test for the stationarity of remainders of the demand function defined in (19) corresponds to the contents 
of the following table, confirming the analyses performed in this area. 
Table 10 –ADF test for the stationarity of remainders (86 observations) 
 
2.2.2.3  INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES 
Once  the  variables  incorporated  in  the  demand  models  have  been  defined,  it’s  important  to  ensure  the 
orthogonality of the model. This exercise is effected within the framework of structural models, in which, as we 
have seen, identification of the models requires compliance with the order condition. In this way, an analysis of 
the endogeneity of the variables in the first equation must be carried out and the instrumental variables defined, 
in addition integrating the exogenous variables which are part of the second equation.  
The exogeneity of the variables in the equation that might be endogenous was tested, since they underscored an 
economic relationship with other variables: “electricity price”, “overnight stays” and “Diesel oil”. “Temperature 
difference” was considered an exogenous variable. The test was performed using the Wu-Hausman T2 statistic. In 
this exercise, instrumental variables had to be defined for each of these variables. Thus the performance of the 
test also provided a solution for the existence of endogeneity, in order to comply with the rank condition. 
An initial group of instrumental variables must be constituted which respect the following restrictions: on the one 
hand, they must not be correlated with the “amount of electricity” dependent variable in the first equation, but 
with the “electricity price” variable. On the other hand, they will include the exogenous variables in the second 
equation. In this way, the two restrictions are respected; the exogenous variable is excluded from one equation 
but included in the other (Reiss and Wolak, 2005). The following variables were defined in this group: 
  The average monthly price (Eur/bbl) for Brent crude oil, the “crude oil price” variable, with 3 months lag.  
  The average monthly price (Eur/t) for coal, the “coal price” variable, with 3 and 12 months lags. 
  Average monthly hydro index (hydrological potential), the “hydraulicity” variable. 
With regard to the definition of the supply function, the reasons for choosing this variable are explicit. 
There is an evident correlation between the market price and the instrumental variables chosen, as can be seen in 
the following table which presents some of the main statistics of an OLS model, taking the market price as the 
dependent variable and the instrumental variables as the independent variable. 
Choosen order 0
Statitistic test -7.331
Critical value for the ADF statistic -4.59526 
Table 11 –OLS model statistics for market price and instrumental variables (series Jan 99 - Feb-2006) 
 
It can also be observed that the ADF test carried out
19 suggests that the model is stationary, despite the market 
price being I(1) and the fact that, as we shall see, the instrumental variables are also I(1), with the exception of 
“Hydraulicity”, which is stationary. 
A second group of instrumental variables was defined, related to consumption of automotive gas oil and overnight 
stays in hotels. In this case, instrumental variables were chosen which reproduce the seasonal nature of these 
variables and the economic trend
20: 
  The “Diesel oil” and “Overnight stays” variables 12 months lagged. 
  The  monthly  trend  for  the  industrial  production  index,  the  “Industrial  production”  variable,  and  the 
monthly GDP estimate, the “GDP” variable. 
The inclusion of instrumental variables with lags enables short-term adjustments to be taken into account and the 
model thus becomes dynamic. 
Table 12 shows that the “GDP” and “industrial production” instrumental variables are stationary, as are “Diesel oil” 
and “Overnight stays”. 
                                                                 
19 0 order, taking into account Schwarz and Akaïke criterium. 
20 Data from theInstituto Nacional de Estadisticas and from Ministerio de Industria, Turismo Y Comercio. 
R
2 76%
t Statistic Coal price (-3)  -2.39
t Statistic Coal price (-12) 4.28
t Statistic Hydro inflows -4.90
t Statistic Oil price (-3) 3.07
-5.905/-4.574 ADF Residuals test/statistic27 
Table 12 –ADF test on GDP and industrial production instrumental variables 
 
The results of the T2 Wu-Hausman statistic given by statistic F reject the hypothesis that the model does not 
experience endogeneity. However, with regard to particular variables, the t statistic for remainders of the number 
of overnight stays does not reject the hypothesis that the variable is not endogenous for a level of significance of 
10%. 
Table 13 – T2 Wu Hausman and remainder tests 
 
Thus, even outside the theoretical framework of structural models, the confirmed existence of endogeneity in the 
demand function requires the application of the Two-Stage Least Square method. The instrumental variables 
chosen are those previously referred to, with the exception of the “overnight stays” variable with 12 month lag, as 
this variable is not endogenous. 
Bearing in mind the significant number of instrumental variables, an overestimation test was performed. For this 
purpose, regression was performed on the remainders after applying the Two-Stage Least Square method in two 
stages on the exogenous variables (“Overnight stays”, “Diesel oil”, “Coal price”, “Oil price”, “Hydraulicity”, “GDP”, 
“Industrial production”), in which R
2 was equal to 0.06. This, multiplied by the number of observations, resulted in 
2.88, a figure below 3.84, the critical value of 5% de χ2 for a degree of freedom
21. This test enables the  null 
hypothesis that all the instrumental variables are exogenous not to be rejected. 
                                                                 





Choosen order 4 2 6 3
Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Statitistic test -8.963 -9.483 -3.940 -5.354
Critical value for the ADF 
statistic -3.467 -3.467 -3.457 -3.457
86 observations 102 observations
Diesel oil residuals -2.2017 [0.031]
Electricity price residuals 1.7372 [0.087]
Overnight stays residuals -1.2682 [0.209]
Residuals T-ratio [Prob.]
T2 Wu-Hausman Statistic
 F( 3,  66)=   3,7099 [0,016]28 
2.2.3  THE DEMAND FUNCTION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE STRUCTURAL MODEL 
2.2.3.1  RESULTS CALCULATED 
As previously stated, two events characterised the wholesale electricity market during the period under analysis: 
the introduction of combined cycle natural gas plants from the beginning of 2004 and the various changes in 
legislation which led to a sharp fall in the amounts of electricity traded on these markets from March 2006. 
Thus, both in the application of the structural model as in the other case, the models were tested for 4 separate 
periods: 
  January 1999 to June 2007. 
  January 1999 to February 2006. 
  January 1999 to December 2003. 
  January 2004 to June 2007. 
The impact of the changes to the framework of the daily and intraday markets from March 2006 onwards is 
analysed with the inclusion of a dummy variable. 
Based on equation (13) and assuming a linear demand function, the demand function will be given by, (model 1): 
                                                                                                                                   (28) 
in which: 
    , is the “amount of electricity” variable in month t. 
    , is the “Electricity price” variable in month t. 
         , is the “Diesel oil” variable in month t. 
          , is the “Temperature difference” variable in month t. 
       , is the “Overnight stays” variable in month t. 
However, as we shall see, most of the variables are not significant when the model is presented in this way. The 
choice was therefore made to use a model in which the temperature difference variable was only included as a 
rotation variable, (model 2): 
                                                                                                                                               (29) 29 
Regression was performed on the demand function. The results of the regressions are only presented when the 
level of significance of the price variable is equal to or less than 5%. The main tests carried out on each regression 
are presented, together with the main statistics applicable to regressions including instrumental variables: 
  GR
2 correlation statistic (Pesaran and Smith, 1994). 
  Sargan statistic, for the specificity of the regression. 
  Test for autocorrelation of remainders, based on the Lagrange multipliers method. 
  Ramsey-Reset functional form text. 
  Heteroscedasticity test, based on the Lagrange multipliers method. 
The chosen model is shaded in orange. The selection criterion is the level of significance of the “price” variable. As 
can be observed, the chosen models were in general more robust than the others. For the period January 1999 to 
December 2003 significant results were obtained for both models. We didn’t obtained significant results for the 
analysis which go beyond December 2003. This is not surprising bearing in mind that from 2004 onwards, the 
operational framework of the market was changed several times and it could not be considered in equilibrium, 
even from a long-term perspective. Given this, the period chosen for analysis was the period January 1999 to 
December 2003. 
For reasons of simplicity, the results for the chosen equation (model 2) only are presented  
Table 14 – Statistics and tests applied 
 
The following table shows that in the case of the “model 1” equation, during the period chosen only the Diesel 
variable is significant at a level of 10%, whilst in “model 2” all the variables with the exception of the constant are 
significant at this level. 
The structural model is then applied to the model 2 equation  for the period January 1999 to December 2003. 
January 1999 - 
December 2003
January 1999 - 
February 2006
January 2004 - 
June 2007
January 1999 - 
June 2007
N.º Observations 48 72 42 90
GR
2  0.4933 0.7407 0.5069 0.31587
Sargan χ2 (3) 0.6208 [0.733] 6.1052 [0.047] 0.1219 [0.727]  0.3912 [0.822]  
Serial Correlation χ2 (1) 0.00102 [0.975] 1.0626 [0.303] 3.8361 [0.050]  30.2981 [0.069]
Functional form χ2 (1) 0.1873 [0.665] 0.2240 [0.636] 1.0093 [0.315] 10.7329 [0.188]
Heteroscedasticity χ2 (1) 0.9998 [0.317] 2.9048 [0.088] 0.8800 [0.348] 0.77637 [0.378]30 
Table 15 – Comparison of results of regression of “models 1 and 2” for the chosen period (January 1999 to 
December 2003) 
 
2.2.3.2  PARAMETERS: DEMAND FUNCTION CURVE AND PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND 
From equation (29) two parameters were obtained that are essential for the model as a whole: the inverse of the 
demand function curve and the price elasticity of demand. 
The former results from the following equation: 
   
   
  
  
                               
   
                                                                                                                                                       (30) 
in which 
   
   , is the ratio of the average values of the market prices and amounts traded and                     ., is the 
average for the temperature difference. In this case, 
   




The latter is obtained as follows: 
   
   
 
 
   
   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     (31) 
In the following section, the value of the price elasticity of demand is compared with the values obtained from the 
application of a model which is not a structural model. 
2.2.4  THE DEMAND FUNCTION OUTSIDE THE STRUCTURAL MODEL 
In this section, the demand function is defined outside the framework of the structural model strictu-senso. The 
model will not only be developed for a single functional form
22, but the functional forms considered in the work of 
Genesove and Mullin (1998) will also be presented (linear, exponential, quadratic and exponential). The equations 
were adapted to this work in order to take into account independent variables other than price. 
                                                                 
22 Following Genesove and Mullin (1998). 
Estimate t test  [Prob.] Estimate t test  [Prob.]
Constant 3620.7 0.1803 [0.858] 874.3508  .31121 [0.757]
Pt -1298.1 -0.3188 [0.751] -735.5126 -3.1054 [0.003]
Dormt 4.9648 0.7977 [0.430] 5.6684  1.7674 [0.084]
Dieselt 0.0064399 2.3929 [0.021] 0.0067753 6.4709 [0.000]
Model 1 Model 231 
The results obtained, specifically in relation to price elasticity of demand, will be compared with each other and 
also compared with the results obtained by applying the structural model. 
It should be stressed, however, that for reasons of comparability with previous results, the instrumental variables 
were maintained. 
2.2.4.1  DEFINITION OF EQUATIONS 
The general functional form is given by the equation (32). 
                                                                                                                                                                                  (32) 
In which   measures the size of the demand market,   is the maximum willingness to pay, Pt is the price and   is 
the convexity index   tends to infinity and 
 
  is a constant. 
In this work, the general equation for linear and quadratic functional forms is given by:  
                            
 
                                                                                                                                        (33) 
in which    is the coefficient of the relationship between the independent variable     and the monthly amounts 
traded  on  the daily and intra-daily markets and   is equal to 1  and 2 in the linear  and quadratic equations 
respectively. It should be recalled that the independent variables are “electricity price”, “overnight stays”, “Diesel 
oil” and a dummy variable whenever the period under analysis includes the year 2006. 
In this case, the price elasticity of demand for the linear form will correspond to: 
 
   
   
  
  
     
   
                                                                                                                                                                                   (34) 
In the case of the quadratic form, the price elasticity of demand is given by: 
   
   
  
  
              
 
   
                                                                                                                                                                  (35) 
In this work, the general equation that supports the logarithmic functional form is given by: 
                         
       
 
                                                                                                                                           (36) 
Using logarithms: 
                                         
 
                                                                                                                 (37) 32 
In this case, the price elasticity of demand is obviously given by: 
   




       
                                                                                                                                                                                   (38) 
In this work, the general equation for the exponential functional form is given by: 
          
  
 
        
    
    +                                                                                                                                                       (39) 
Using logarithms: 
                 
 
                 
 
                                                                                                                             (40) 
The price elasticity of demand corresponds to: 
   




           
             
 
          
 
                                                                                                                                    (41) 
2.2.4.2  RESULTS  
The regression of the demand function was performed for each functional form. As in the previous section, the 
results are only presented for regressions when the level of significance of the price variable is equal to or less 
than 5%. Only in these cases will the price elasticity of demand be used to resolve the equation (11). The tests 
performed are the same as those presented in the previous section. In each case, the model chosen is shaded in 
orange. The selection criterion is the level of significance of the “electricity price” variable. It should be noted that 
for the period January 1999 to December 2003 significant results were obtained for all the functional forms with 
the exception of quadratic forms. 33 
LINEAR FUNCTIONAL FORM  
Table 16 – Statistics and tests applied 
 
Table 17 – Chosen regression 
 
 
January 1999 - 
December 2003
January 1999 - 
February 2006
January 2004 - 
June 2007
January 1999 - 
June 2007
N.º Observations 48 72 42 90
GR
2  0.4933 0.7407 0.5069 0.31587
Sargan χ2 (3) 0.6208 [0.733] 6.1052 [0.047] 0.1219 [0.727]  0.3912 [0.822]  
Serial Correlation χ2 (1) 0.00102 [0.975] 1.0626 [0.303] 3.8361 [0.050]  30.2981 [0.069]
Functional form χ2 (1) 0.1873 [0.665] 0.2240 [0.636] 1.0093 [0.315] 10.7329 [0.188]
Heteroscedasticity χ2 (1) 0.9998 [0.317] 2.9048 [0.088] 0.8800 [0.348] 0.77637 [0.378]
Estimate T-Ratio  [Prob.]
Constant -537.0519 -0.2067 [0.837]
Pt -446.941 -2.420 [0.020]
Dormt 6.0365 1.944 6 [0.058]
DifTempt 156.3425 2.4853 [0.017]
Dieselt 0.006949 6.8757 [0.000]
January 1999 - ￿ December 200334 
LOGARITHMIC FUNCTIONAL FORM  
Table 18 – Statistics and tests applied 
 
Table 19 – Chosen regression  
   
EXPONENTIAL FUNCTIONAL FORM 
Table 20 – Statistics and tests applied  
 
Table 21 – Chosen regression  
January 1999 - 
December 2003
January 1999 - 
February 2006
January 2004 - 
June 2007
January 1999 - 
June 2007
N.º Observations 48 72 42 90
GR
2  0.5316 0.77414 0.5069 0.26067
Sargan χ2 (3) 1.4281 [0.490] 3.3414 [0.188] 0.1219 [0.727] 0.27512 [0.600] 
Serial Correlation χ2 (1) 1.4665 [0.226] 0.4068 [0.524] 3.8361 [0.050] 11.2540 [0.001]
Functional form χ2 (1) 0.03592 [0.850] 0.1310 [0.717] 1.0093 [0.315] 0.06000 [0.806]
Heteroscedasticity χ2 (1) 3.1908 [0.074] 1.3175 [0.251] 0.880 [0.348] 1.1008 [0.294]
Estimate T-Ratio  [Prob.]
Constant -6.6898 -2.0853 [0.043]
Ln(Pt) -0.098241 -2.1803 [0.035]
Ln(Dormt) 0.10104 2.4368 [0.019]
Ln(DifTempt) 0.041384 2.1857 [0.034]
Ln(Dieselt) 1.0856  5.0425 [0.000]
January 1999 - ￿ December 2003
January 1999 - 
December 2003
January 1999 - 
February 2006
January 2004 - 
June 2007
January 1999 - 
June 2007
N.º Observations 48 72 42 90
GR
2  0.54375 0.6585 0.5649 0.50444
Sargan χ2 (3) 1.5991 [0.660] 3.9026 [0.272] 1.0471  [0.592] 1.0471 [0.592]
Serial Correlation χ2 (1) 1.5907 [0.207]  1.6272 [0.202] 3.1672  [0.075] 3.1672 [0.075]
Functional form χ2 (1) 0.6591 [0.417] 1.4912 [0.222]  0.00574  [0.940] 0.005739 [0.940]
Heteroscedasticity χ2 (1) 2.3468 [0.126] 0.08483 [0.771] 0.00159  [0.968] 0.001587 [0.968]35 
 
PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND 
The following table shows the price elasticity of demand calculated for the chosen periods and functional forms. 
The values presented for the different functional forms are close, being between -8.9% and -9.9%
23. The value 
calculated for the structural model, for a linear equation
24, falls within this interval. 
Table 22 – Price elasticity of demand 
 
2.3  DEFINITION OF THE BEHAVIOUR VARIABLE 
We will begin with a definition of the behaviour variable θ outside the structural model for the period 1999 to 
2003, a period in which significant values were able to be obtained for the price elasticity of demand. The details 
of the estimate of its main variables, namely marginal cost, lie beyond the scope of this work, and only the main 
assumptions will be presented in this section. Later, the behavioural factor is estimated using the structural model 
for the same period, and the results obtained are compared with the results obtained outside this methodological 
framework. 
                                                                 
23 Values around 10% are generaly considered (see for example Borenstein, et al. (1999))  
24 It is noted that in addition to this analysis we calculated the price elasticity of demand out of the Structural model, keepi ng 
the instrumental variables except the price of  fuels that were considered without lag. In this case, the price elasticity of the 
demand is about -0.0847. 
 
Estimate T-Ratio  [Prob.]
Constant -5.339 -1.9208 [0.061]
Pt -0.030861 -2.2277 [0.031]
Ln(Dormt) 0.099861 2.7127 [0.010]
Ln(DifTempt) 0.034131 2.0502 [0.046]
Ln(Dieselt) 0.99384 5.4086 [0.000]














2.3.1  DEFINITION  OF  THE  BEHAVIOURAL  VARIABLE  OUTSIDE  THE  STRUCTURAL  MODEL  FOR 
THE PERIOD 1999 TO 2003. 
2.3.1.1  ASSUMPTIONS 
The definition of the behavioural variable requires marginal cost to be defined. The marginal cost of a market can 
reflect  the  structure  of  the  production  costs  for  this  market  or  only  correspond  to  the  marginal  cost  of  the 
electricity  generating  power  station  that  has  sold  electricity  at  the  highest  price,  which  corresponds  to  the 
marginal power station. This latter type of market corresponds to the uniform price market and is the type of 
market that has been operating in Spain.  
In this kind of market, the marginal cost of the market is very close to the cost variable for the power station which 
sets the market price. 
In monthly terms, marginal cost corresponds to the weighted average for the amounts traded at any given hour in 
the marginal cost schedule: 
       
        
 
   
    
 
   
   
       
 
   
    
 
   
                                                                                                                                       (42) 
in which      is the weighted marginal cost of the market in the month t, n is the number of hours h, is the 
month t,      is the marginal cost of the market at the hour h,     is the cost variable for the marginal power 
station the hour h and    is the amount traded on the market at the hour h.  
OMEL, the operator for the Spanish daily and intraday markets, defines the origins of the electricity that has set 
the market price for each hour,  i.e., the marginal offer, and groups them by  technology type. However, the 
information supplied by OMEL does not distinguish between certain technologies which define the closing price, 
namely between the coal and fuel oil power plants. 
Moreover, OMEL provides the amounts traded on the daily and intra-daily markets. In this way, the variable Qh in 
equation (42) is known. However, the definition of the variable CVh in this equation requires establishing a set of 
assumptions in order to enable: 
1.  Definition  of  the  cost  function  variable  associated  with  the  technology/type  of  marginal  power  station, 
bearing in mind the nomenclature given by OMEL for the origins of the electricity that sets the market price. 
2.  Definition of the parameters that enable the cost variable to be calculated
25. 
                                                                 
25 For this aim, we follow Steiner(2000), Wolfram(1999), between others. 37 
In this context, the marginal cost for the system was calculated in the following ways: 
1.  For production valued at the cost of the conventional power plants (coal, fuel oil) or combined cycle 
natural gas plants, the production costs are calculated on the basis of the average market prices for 
the fuels and the standard values for O&M costs and the revenue of the power stations. Production 
from hydroelectric plants is valued at the production costs for the plants (which correspond to O&M 
costs), with the exception of months in which hydro inflows is significantly below the average for the 
“dry” period of the water resources year, which are valued at the cost of the fuel oil plants. This 
approach is referred to as “marginal cost (a)”. 
2.  The previous point also applies to hydroelectric production, which is valued at the cost of the fuel oil 
power plants, with the exception of months in which hydro inflows is above the average for the “wet” 
period of the water resources year, which are valued at the production cost of the hydroelectric plants 
(O&M costs). This approach s referred to as “marginal cost (b)”. 
3.  For production valued at the cost of conventional power plants (coal, fuel oil) or combined cycle 
natural gas plants, the production costs are defined on the basis of costs verified in Portugal for 
equivalent technologies during the same period. The production of hydroelectric plants is valued at 
the hydroelectric plant production cost (which corresponds to O&M costs), with the exception of 
months in which a hydro inflow significantly below the average for the “dry” period of the water 
resources year. This approach is referred to as “marginal cost Portugal”. 
Parallel to this, when at a given hour h, of a month m, the power station supplying the closing price is defined as a 
conventional power plant by OMEL and if the cost variable is defined as corresponding at that hour to that of a fuel 
oil or coal power station, two different criteria are followed: 
1.  It is divided between the fuel oil or coal power station according to the average for electricity production for 
each of these technologies in the month m of the stated hour.
26  
2.  It is defined as that of the fuel oil power station at the hours in which the amounts traded are above the 
hourly average for the respective year, and as that of the coal power station for the hours in which the 
amounts traded are above the hourly average for the respective year. 
When power plants are defined according to criteria 2), the previous series are represented in this work as: 
marginal cost (a)’; marginal cost (b)’ and marginal cost Portugal’. 
                                                                 
26 This assumption is due to the fact that in power systems with nuclear power plants, such is the case of the Spanish system, 
coal power plants are, frequently, the marginal power plants. 38 
2.3.1.2  BEHAVIOURAL FACTOR 
In this section, the regression (20):     
            
                           , in order to estimate the Lerner       , in 
which      is the marginal cost in the month t and, consequently, defines behavioural factor    by resolving 
equation (21):  
      
       . 
ESTIMATE FOR LERNER INDEX 
The Lerner Index is an indicator of the exercise of market power. Lerner Index trends may easily be associated with 
various external events. The increase in the Lerner Index from 2001 onwards coincides with the threat made by 
the European Union to the maintenance of the CTC payments. With the disappearance of this threat, the Lerner 
Index was seen to fall. Later, the entry of the new combined cycle natural gas power centres whose importance 
can be highlighted from 2004 onwards and which were not governed by the CTCs coincides with a rise in this 
index. Finally, the implementation of Royal Decree-Law no. 3/2006 set a maximum price for trading in the pool 
amongst companies from the same group and offered a strong incentive to reduce the Lerner Index from this date 
onwards.  
A series of statistical tests were carried out, whose presentation lies beyond the scope of this work, showing that 
equation (20) is stationary and the autocorrelation of the remainders can be verified.  
Table 23 shoes that the estimate for the Lerner Index presents high values of 0.2 or above, with the exception of 
the marginal cost b)’ series. It should be noted that the existence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of 
remainders led to an adjustment in the regression through the Newey-West variance matrix. It can also be noted 
that the regression in “marginal cost Portugal” presents results that are closer to reality. 
An interpretation of these results requires the resolution of equation (21). 39 
Table 23 - Results for the period 1999-2003 
 
 
DEFINITION OF THE BEHAVIOURAL VARIABLE DURING THE PERIOD 1999-2003 
Thus, having made the estimates for the left-hand side of this equation in the previous section, the Herfindahl 
Index HHI
27 remains to be defined in order to estimate the behavioural parameter    during the period 1999-2003. 
Internalising an average HHI value
28 weighted by production equal to  30.5%, the estimates for the  behaviour 
parameter    are presented in the following table.  
At this point, it is important to note that the concentration level of a market may be related to the efficiency of its 
agents and, consequently, the marginal cost and market structure will be two endogenous variables (see, for 
example, Church and Ware, 2000), distorting any behavioural analysis based on the Herfindahl Index. However, 
during the period under analysis, in the Iberian Peninsula the market structure for energy production does not 
result from competitive pressures, as is the case in the rest of Europe, but from the structure of the existing 
market before liberalisation. 
Estimates of the average value of the behavioural variable resulting from the resolution of equation (21) for the 
period under analysis, 1999-2003 are only presented for the linear demand function, as the price elasticity of 
demand presents values that are very close, regardless of the functional form of the demand function. It should be 
recalled that the estimated price elasticity of demand module was 9.33%. 
                                                                 
27. It’s important to refer that the Herfindahl was not calculated for Special regime producers. Nothwithstanding the production 
based on renewable sources is traded in the pool, in the period analysed their remuneration was independent from market 
price. 
28  By corporate group. 
Coefficient T-Ratio [Prob.] Coefficient T-Ratio [Prob.] Coefficient T-Ratio [Prob.] Coefficient T-Ratio [Prob.]
λ 0.38776 9.6156 [0.000] 0.1975 4.4574 [0.000] 0.18326 3.7879 [0.000] 0.41285  20.3947 [0.000]
 AR parameter - - - - 0.56706 Ut (-1) (5.3326) [0.000]   - -
Marginal cost Portugal Marginal cost (b) Marginal cost (b) 
without Nov.01_Feb.02
Marginal cost (a)
Coefficient T-Ratio [Prob.] Coefficient T-Ratio [Prob.] Coefficient T-Ratio [Prob.]
λ 0.3310 7.274 [0.000] 0.1412 2.139 [0.037] 0.3818 12.497 [0.000]
Marginal cost (a)' Marginal cost (b)' Marginal cost Portugal'40 




It should be recalled that the closer    is to 1, the closer we are to finding strategic behaviour of the Nash-Cournot 
type, whereas when it is closer to 0, the agents are closer to a competitive situation. In this work, despite the high 
mark-up, the results are inconclusive, and, with all the due care required by the application of the methodology for 
conjectural variables, the results for the marginal cost b) and b)’ series indicate the existence of a competitive 
market. 
2.3.2  THE  SUPPLY  FUNCTION  EQUATION  AND  DEFINITION  OF  THE  BEHAVIOURAL  FACTOR 
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE STRUCTURAL MODEL 
Due to the problems in identifying structural models, in this context the supply equation must include the demand 
rotation component. Thus, equation (17) must be solved, represented in this case as: 
                  
 
              
 
                                                                                                                  (43) 
The Cmgj variables represent the factors that enable the marginal cost to be calculated. The second variable on the 
right-hand side of the equation corresponds to demand. The last variable is the rotation variable for the demand 
function  whose  parameters  were  defined  in  resolving  the  demand  equation.  The  coefficient  for  this  variable 
corresponds to the behaviour variable.  
The marginal cost of the system is defined by the production costs of the power stations which set the closing 
price for the market.  
The production of electricity is a capital-intensive activity in which investment costs represent a large part of the 


















0.101 0.043 0.11741 
As stated in the previous section, the power stations using conventional technologies which set the closing price 
are the coal and fuel oil
29 power plants, combined cycle natural gas plants  and the hydroelectric power plants. 
Therefore the variables chosen to estimate the average marginal cost of the system are: 
  The average monthly price of Brent oil with 3 months lag, Eur/bbl, which represents the cost of the natural 
gas combined cycle power s and the fuel oil plants. It is common practice for natural gas supply contracts 
to index their prices to the price of oil or its derivatives, with time lag between 3 and 6 months. In addition, 
the price of oil is not immediately reflected in the marginal cost of the fuel oil plants, on the one hand, 
since this is a derivative and, on the other hand, due to the stock management policy in these centres. 
  For coal power stations, the average monthly price, Eur/t, of coal with 3 months lag, in order to reflect the 
stock management policy. 
  The hydraulicity coefficient, bearing in mind the importance of hydrological production. 
These latter variables are exogenous to the model
30 and were included as instrumental variables in the previous 
equation. 
Variables were chosen that are directly related to the theoretical marginal cost of the system, because this cost is 
not necessarily the actual marginal cost incurred. In the first case, the marginal cost only depends on factors which 
influence the variables cost production for the power stations which set the market prices: the average fuel prices 
and hydraulicity (hydrological inflows) for the month. In practice, the marginal cost of the system will also depend 
on technical restrictions and company strategies. These factors should be included in the behavioural variable λ. 
Equation (43) may therefore be re-written in the following way: 
                                                     
 
                                                                          (44) 
In which: 
        , is the average monthly price of Brent oil lagged 3 months. 
         , is the average monthly price of API#2 NW Europe coal lagged 3 months . 
        is the “hydraulicity” for the month t. 
     , is the behaviour variable 
                                                                 
29 Reuters data. 
30 As the T2  Wu-Hausmann statistic present in the section shows. 42 
However, it is debateable whether the marginal cost of the system function, which depends on fuel prices and 
hydro inflows, is a linear function. Nerlove therefore (1965) applied the Cobb-Douglas function when defining the 
production function for the electricity sector. Since then various functions have been applied, including Translog 
(for example, Christensen and Greene (1976) and, more recently, Maloney (2001)).  
It was stated in the previous section that the marginal cost of the system is close to the variable cost of the power 
stations which set the closing price. These are the hydroelectric plants or power stations, according to hydro 
inflows. In this process of “choosing” between technologies, hydro inflows are taken to be external data. The 
choice between the power plants will be made by taking into account the competitiveness of each technology 
which, in turn, will directly depend on the relative price of each fuel. In this way, it was considered that the dual 
function of the Translog production function, i.e. the Translog function of the cost function, would be the most 
appropriate in this case. This inverse function generally includes the amounts produced. However, given the small 
size of the sample this approach may not be the most accurate as it implies a reduction in the degree of statistical 
freedom. Thus, as is the case with other authors (see, for example, Griffin and Gregory (1976)), it will only be 
applied separately to productive factors. 
In  this new  framework, the relations shown in the equation  (44) are revised in order to show the  following 
variables: 
                               
 
                                                                                  (45) 
In  which        is  the  marginal  cost  function  and         is  the  fuel  function.  The                            
           
                                                                                                      (46) 
The       function is applied to the dual Translog production function, i.e. to the Translog cost function, which 
shows the elasticity of substituting the two power station technologies: 
                                                
                   
 
                                                                                                                        (47) 
Thus, by using logarithms in equation (50) and integrating it into equation (52), the following is obtained: 
                                             
 
                                                      
                                                   
 
                                                                                    (48) 
The behavioural variable     will be estimated for equations (44) and (48). 43 
2.3.2.1  SUPPLY FUNCTION VARIABLES 
Both the price of coal and the price of oil followed an upward trend during the period under analysis. It should be 
noted, however, that this trend was more mitigated during the period between January 1999 and December 2003, 
the period to which the model was applied. Hydro inflows, in turn, are characterised by instability around the unit. 
Figure 2-4 – Variables which characterise marginal cost 
 
The following table shows that there is little correlation between the variables
31. 
                                                                 
31 The variable “Difference of temperature” is included in this analysis due to be one of the factors wich calculates the rotation 
























































































































































Oil €/bbl Coal €/t Hydro index44 
Table 25 – Correlation coefficient for variables 
 
The descriptive statistics for the variables which define marginal cost are shown in the following table. It can be 
observed that the average value for  hydro index was only 0.82  during the period under analysis, which  was 
particularly dry. 
Table 26 – Descriptive statistics for variables  
 
2.3.2.2  STATIONARITY OF THE SUPPLY FUNCTION 
The following tables show that the hydro coefficient is the only stationary variable which defines marginal cost. 
Coal price (-3)   Coal price (-12)     Oil price (-3)   Hydro       Overnight stays      Difference of 
temperature      
Amount of 
electricity     
Coal price (-3)   1.000 0.49657 0.37879 -0.15651 0.024733 0.073055 0.53131
Coal price (-12)     0.49657 1.000 0.54121 -0.38592 0.0004151 0.070356 0.5765
Oil price (-3)   0.37879 0.54121 1.000 -0.05824 -0.016976 0.11474 0.46533
Hydro       -0.15651 -0.38592 -0.05824 1.000 -0.26575 -0.33473 -0.23867
Overnight stays      0.024733 0.0004151 -0.016976 -0.26575 1.000 0.15409 -0.024948
Difference of temperature       0.073055 0.070356 0.11474 -0.33473 0.15409 1.000 0.43088
Amount of electricity      0.53131 0.5765 0.46533 -0.23867 -0.024948 0.43088 1.000
Hydro index Oil price Coal price
Observations 102 102 102
Unit: - €/bbl €/t
Minimum 0.110 8.659 25.160
Maximum 2.200 53.942 63.484
Average 0.819 30.369 43.177
Median 0.680 27.148 44.701
Standard deviation 0.461 10.625 10.520
Variance 0.212 112.895 110.671
Kurtosis  0.914 -0.427 -1.149
Skewness 1.122 0.514 -0.14745 
Table 27 –ADF tests - 102 observations 
 
Table 28 –ADF tests - 86 observations 
 
The oil and coal price variables are are integrated of order 1. 
Table 29 –ADF tests for order 1 variables - 101 observations 
 











Choosen order 0 0 1 1 4
Trend No Yes No Yes No
Statistic test -1.086 -1.947 -1.882 -2.339 -5.089
Critical value for the 










Choosen order 0 0 1 1 4
Trend No Yes No Yes No
Statistic test -1.317 -1.740 -2.095 -2.117 -4.428
Critical value for the 









Choosen order 0 0 0 0
Trend No Yes No Yes
Statistic test -8.731 -8.692 -7.048 -7.014
Critical value for the 









Choosen order 0 0 0 0
Trend No Yes No Yes
Statistic test -8.152 -8.139 -5.257 -5.218
Critical value for the 
ADF statitistic -2.899 -3.467 -2.899 -3.46746 
Using Johansen’s method for a VAR model of order 1 indicated by information criteria, the statistics presented in 
the following tables allow the H0 hypotheses for the non-existence of one and two co-integration relationships to 
be  clearly rejected, and  point out  that  the  H0  hypothesis for the  existence of more than two  co-integration 
relationships cannot be accepted.  
In this way, two co-integration vectors exist which support the relationship already demonstrated between the 
price and amount of electricity variables:               ; as well as the co-integration relationship between coal 
and oil prices:                           
Table 31 – Statistics for the Maximal Eigenvalue (86 observations) for a VAR model of order 1 
 
Table 32 – Trace statistics (86 observations) for a VAR model of order 1 
 
2.3.2.3  INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES 
Within the framework of the structural model, equation (51) is solved using the 2-Stage Least Square method. 
Thus the identification of this equation requires that the exogenous variables defined in the other equation in the 
model should be considered instrumental variables. It should be recalled that these variables were “overnight 
stays”, “temperature differences” and “Diesel oil”
32. The latter can already be found indirectly in equation (51), in 
                                                                 
32 As see, this variable is not truely exogenous of the model. This is the reason why the variable was substitute by instrumental 
variables defined for the quantity of electricity and the diesel fuel consumption (GDP, Industrial production index and diesel 
fuel).  




r = 0 r=1 29,03 27,42 24,99
r <= 1 r=2 27,65 21,12 19,02
r <= 2 r=3 3,31 14,88 12,98
r <= 3 r=4 1,71 8,07 6,50




r = 0 r=1 61.70 48.88 45.70
r <= 1 r=2 32.67 31.54 28.78
r <= 2 r=3 5.02 17.86 15.75
r <= 3 r=4 1.71 8.07 6.5047 
the demand variable rotation. So instead we used the average monthly temperature. It may be noted that this 
variable may also serve as an instrumental variable for the hydraulicity coefficient.  
With regard to the variables which set marginal cost, the dynamic character of the existing relations in the case of 
the  seasonality  of  fuel  prices  and  the  establishment  of  stock  were  considered,  in  addition  to  the  periodicity 
(alternating wet and dry periods) of hydro inflows. Thus, in addition to the variables already mentioned, the 
following instrumental variables were considered: 
  “Hydraulicity coefficient” lagged 3, 6 and 12 months. 
  “Average coal price” lagged 12 months. 
  “Average oil price” lagged 12 months. 
It should be noted, however, that unlike the case of the demand equation, in this case the results of the Wu-
Hausman statistics did not reject the possibility that the equation did not suffer from endogeneity. With regard to 
the variables in particular, the hypothesis of a non-endogenous variable was only rejected in the case of the t 
statistic for the demand (“Amount of electricity”). 
Table 33 – T2 Wu Hausman and remainder tests 
 
It is important to note that the inclusion of fuel price variables 12 months lagged, together with the hydraulicity 
index with several lags, in equation (51) was tested. However, it was decided to include this with the instrumental 
variables since these variables are not significant to the model and also because the behavioural variable was not 
significant in any of the cases. It must be stressed that the test for the overestimation of instrumental variables 
allowed the null hypothesis that all instrumental variables were exogenous not to be rejected. 
Hydro residuals  1.4842 [0.146]
Coal price residuals 0.2202 [0.827]
Oil price residuals 0.15004 [0.882]





F(3,39) = 7.4746 [0.188]
T-ratio for residuals [Prob.]48 
2.3.2.4  RESULTS 
LINEAR FUNCTION 
Various models were tested for the different instrumental variables whose use was considered predictable given 
the variables in equation (51).The model chosen presents a level of significance of less than 10% for the rotation of 
the demand, which can be interpreted as robust in the statistical tests that were carried out. 
In this model, for 48 observations (up to December 2003), the variables were not very significant, specifically those 
relating to fuel prices. However, by extending the series to February 2006 (72 observations), all the variables 
became more significant. It can equally be observed that consideration over a longer period of time does not alter 
the coefficient attributed to the rotation variable, which enables the behavioural factor to be defined. This value 
lies at around 0.054, indicating a competitive market. It is close to the value obtained when analysis is performed 
outside the structural model for the marginal cost b) simulation excluding the period November 2002 to February 
2003.  49 
Table 34 – Statistics and tests applied 
 
Table 35 – Regression chosen 
 
FUNCTION BASED ON THE TRANSLOG MODEL 
Initially the Translog model was applied to the variables defined for the linear model. The resulting O model is 
called the “base logarithm model” in this text. 
January 1999 - 
December 2003
January 1999 - 
December 2003
N.º Observations 48 72
GR
2  0.31288 0.58631
Sargan χ2 (3) 2.0739 [0.355]   0.5188 [0.972]  
Serial Correlation χ2 (1) 3.5441 [0.060] 8.8147 [0.003]
Functional form χ2 (1) 0.03194 [0.858] 0.01989 [0.888]
Heteroscedasticity χ2 (1) 0.4663 [0.495] 0.2584 [0.611]
Coefficient T-ratio  [Prob.] Coefficient T-ratio  [Prob.]
Constant -4.5369 -.75148 [0.457] 0.81635 -1.9208 [0.061]
Oil price (-3) 0.010074 0.2825 [0.779] -0.039856  -1.9571 [0.054]
Coal price (-3) 0.049354 0 .3497 [0.728] 0.14786 4.8609 [0.000]
Hydro -2.3575 -2.4650 [0.018] 0.053211  2.4592 [0.016]
Amount of electricity 0.0006352  1.7757 [0.083] 0.0002727    .1526E-3             1.7863 [0.079]
Variable of rotation 0.053596       1.7591 [0.086] 0.053211 2.4592 [0.016]
January 1999 - December 2003 January 1999 - December 200350 
Table 36 – Results of applying the base logarithm model 
 
In which,  
  a1, is the coefficient of the logarithm for the “oil price” variable, with 3 months lag. 
  a2, is the coefficient of the logarithm for the “coal price”, with 3 months lag. 
  a3, is the coefficient of the logarithm for the “hydraulicity” variable. 
  a4, is the coefficient of the logarithm for the demand “rotation” variable. 
  a5, is the coefficient of the logarithm for the “amount of electricity” variable. 
The instrumental variables in this model correspond to the logarithms for the instrumental variables in the model 
defined in the previous section. 
The demand “rotation” variable is not significant in this model, although the statistics indicate that the model is 
robust. 
Table 37 – Statistics and tests applied to the base logarithm model  
 
Coefficient T-Ratio [Prob.]
Constant 32.1171 0.4287 [0.670]
a1 -1.947 -0.07377 [0.942]
a1^2 3.8156 0.4916 [0.626]
a2 2.947 -
a2^2 2.5758 -
a1 x a2 -6.3914 -0.36100 [0.720]
a3 -0.041962 -0.04785 [0.962]
a4 -0.22805  -0.3100 [0.758]




Sargan χ2 (3) 0.2054 [0.902] 
Serial Correlation χ2 (1) 0.9603 [0.327]
Functional form χ2 (1) 0.08111 [0.776]
Heteroscedasticity χ2 (1) 0.08040 [0.777]51 
3  CONCLUSIONS 
Structural  models  require  analyses  to  be  formulated  with  great  accuracy,  since  they  depend  on  a  complex 
theoretical framework which involves the definition of balanced economic relationships such as the definition of 
the functional forms of the equations which comprise the model. In applying this methodology to the analysis of 
the exercise of market power, the methodological rigour associated with structural models may make it difficult to 
obtain results that consistently prove its existence. In this case, the application of the structural model to the 
electricity  sector  was  performed  on  the  basis  of  a  set  of  assumptions  concerning  the  underlying  economic 
relationships and the functional forms of the functions defining the endogenous variables, validated by using 
estimates for variables outside the framework of the structural model. Thus, the price elasticity of demand was 
defined with values that were very close, assuming a linear functional form for demand within the framework of 
the  structural  models  for  the  values  obtained  outside  this  framework  for  log-linear,  linear  and  exponential 
functional forms. Moreover, the value obtained for the behavioural variable, which is close to that of a competitive 
situation, is close to the results obtained outside the framework of the structural model, on the basis of estimates 
of marginal costs for production. However, the results are restricted to the period between 1999 and 2003, as a 
result of the changes which took place in the structure and functioning of the market from 2004 onwards, which 
removed the market from a state of balance.  
It is important to focus with greater care on the results for the behavioural component.  
In focussing on causal relationships, the new industrial school aims to infer the possible causes of a high level of 
concentration, such as can be verified in the Spanish market for the period under analysis and to determine 
whether this results from anti-competitive behaviour or, on the contrary, from more efficient efforts made by 
companies in the face of their competitors. However, the capacity to exercise market power and the realisation of 
anti-competitive strategies should not be confused, as this study demonstrates in terms of electricity production 
under a market regime. This is because, in the case of electricity production, the differences between these two 
trends are more marked than in other sectors, due to their specific characteristics. These characteristics take 
shape in the form of two related trends which only partially cancel each other out. On the one hand, electricity 
production can be based on “anti-competitive” strategies, even at relatively low levels of concentration, due to its 
characteristics, which include the price elasticity of demand below the unit, the difficulty in storing the product 
and the fact that it is a capital-intensive sector, with long periods required for a return on investments. On the 
other hand, this natural tendency to exercise market power and, above all, the fact that electricity is an essential 
commodity, make this sector extremely  regulated, even  when  exercised under a market regime,  including in 
economies  that  are  more  open  to  private  initiatives,  limiting  the  actions  of  economic  agents  (sometimes  by 
anticipating the future actions of the regulators). 
Thus, due  to the nature of  electricity production, the exercise of  market power will occur naturally  in these 
markets, and this trend is very often impeded due to its framework. Typically, in a pioneering study by Wolfram 52 
(1999), the author concludes, in the case of the former English and Wales market at the end of the 1990s, that 
prices  were  much  higher  than  marginal  costs,  demonstrating  the  existence  of  market  power.  However,  this 
difference was less than was to be expected, given the structure of the English market at the time.  
This study also points in this direction. The result of the structural model
33 supports the apparently competitive 
nature of the market analysed for the period 1999 to 2003, despite than fact that the Lerner index average was 
high during this period, although not as high as would have been expected given the high  concentration and low 
price elasticity of demand. Similar results were  obtained when the behavioural variable, within the theoretical 
framework of conjectural variables, was determined directly on the basis of estimates of marginal costs.  
It will therefore be important in future work to analyse whether the high average  mark-up verified accords with 
the CTCs which frame the activities of the electricity producers. The CTCs have the characteristics of contracts for 
difference
34. In this way, the profit maximisation function (2) will have to be revised, given that during the exercise 
of this mechanism it would be expected that the average mark-up would be close to 0 and the results calculated 
for the behavioural variable will probably be different. 
   
                                                                 
33 Noticed that the robustness of the results obtained for the price elasticity of demand based on the strucutural model was 
corroborated when the variable was estimated outside the model and for different functional forms of the model. 
34 At least on average (see Iberdrola case and the analysis of Fabra & Toro, 2005). 53 
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